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1961]
CRIMINAL LAW -

COMMENTS
INSANE PERSONS -

INFLUENCE OF MENTAL

Defendants in the
criminal process are divided into rigidly exclusive categories of
mental health. The competent to stand trial are first separated
from the incompetent.1 Then the competent are divided on the
basis of their mental state at the time of their acts between the
"sane" and the "insane."2 As long as these rigid categories are
administered in an adversary trial system, some misdirection of
victims of serious mental illness3 into the penal system is almost
inevitable. Even where mental illness might otherwise prevent
conviction, those accused of non-capital felonies are not likely to
raise the question,4 and few courts are likely to do so for them. 5
Once such misdirection has taken place at trial, the possible inappropriateness of imprisoning the mentally ill remains largely beyond the reach of legal examination. After conviction there are
ILLNESS ON THE PAROLE RETURN PROCESS -

1 See generally Comment, Criminal Law -Insane Persons - Competency To Stand
Trial, 59 MICH. L. REv. 1078 (1961).
2 See generally PERKINS, CRIMINAL I.Aw 738-76 (1957).
8 A discussion of the sanity test arguments of M'Naghten's case, 10 Cl. &: F. 200, 8
Eng. Rep. 718 (HL. 1843), and Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954),
is beyond the scope of this study. Literature on the subject is extensive. Any test, no
matter how enlightened, forces a decision that a defendant at the time of his act was
either sane and altogether responsible or insane and altogether irresponsible. The cases
of twelve convicts returned from parole described in the appendix appear to the authors
to defy any such attempt to provide precise categories for a phenomenon as complex as
human behavior. Categorization is judicial "magic" - see generally FRANK, COURTS ON
TRIAL 50-61 (1949) - tending to gloss over the appalling difficulty of regulating human
behavior. Such "magic"' induces abandonment of concern for the mental health of those
who fall on the "sane" side of whatever line is drawn. Although one or two of the cases
described might have fallen within the "insane" category had the matter been seriously
litigated, the responsibility of each of the twelve appears sufficiently diminished to cause
uneasiness about continued imprisonment in a penal system not primarily devoted to
the care and treatment of mental illness. The solution may be greatly reduced concern
with the legal definitions of sanity and competency at the trial stage and correspondingly
greater concern with post-trial institutionalization.
4' The initiative for raising an insanity defense rests exclusively with the defendant.
A minor felon will likely submit to a determinate prison sentence rather than volunteer
for the indeterminate commitment to a mental hospital which a successful insanity defense
entails in some jurisdictions. Thus the insanity defense seems almost entirely the product
of the death penalty. See WEIHOFEN, THE URGE To PUNISH 146-48 (1956); Szasz, Book
Review, 21 PSYCHIATRY 307, 317 (1958). The defendant's denial of his own illness as well
as a pathological desire for punishment may prevent a decision even this rational. See
Goldstein, Police Discretion Not To Invoke the Criminal Process: Low-Visibility Decisions
in the Administration of Justice, 69 YALE L.J. 543, 544 n.4 (1960).
Ii The prosecution and the court usually share the initiative with the defense to raise
by motion the question of competency to stand trial. See Comment, 59 MICH. L. REv. 1078
(1961). Even if prosecutors, judges, and defense counsel might otherwise be perceptive
of problems of mental illness, a complex interaction of forces centered on desires to
punish and to be punished tends to dominate the criminal trial process and obscure such
perception. See WEIHOFEN, op. cit. supra note 4, at 138-46; ZII.BOORG, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
THE CRIMINAL Acr AND PUNISHMENT 77-87 (1954).
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few occasions which one might call "justiciable events"6 when the
balanced considerations of criminality and mental illness stand
precisely defined for flexible, dispassionate examination. The
questions which might be asked are obscured in the vague penumbra of post-conviction due process,7 and the issues are further
blurred by the fact that present prisons and mental hospitals both
tend to be thought of as primarily custodial.8 Hence, mentally ill
convicts generally percolate through the penal system0 and eventually become eligible for parole. At that stage, their mental illnesses may not be recognized10 or, if recognized, not thought to
present an unreasonable risk under a liberal parole policy.11 Many
6 Compare the concept of "visibility" developed in Goldstein, supra note 4, at 551-52.
7 See generally Tappan, The Legal Rights of Prisoners, 293 ANNALS 99 (1954).
8 See Note, 36 MINN. L. REv. 933 (1952); Birnbaum, Some Questions That a Lawyer
Might Ask a Psychiatrist Concerning "The Psychopath Before the Law," 261 NEW ENGU..ND
J. MEDICINE 1220 (1959).
9 Some states provide for administrative transfers between penal and mental institutions, thereby theoretically accomplishing what trial courts fail to do. See, e.g., GA. CODE
ANN. § 77-310 (Supp. 1958) (assignment to hospital based on classification when entering
prison); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-194 (1960); IowA CODE § 246.16 (1958); MICH. CO!',IP.
LAws § 330.66 (1948} (transfer to mental hospital on advice of prison physician). These
administrative transfer statutes affect only the remaining term of imprisonment, with
further custody dependent upon civil commitment on completion of sentence. All but
three of thirty jurisdictions replying to a questionnaire stated that administrative transfers were available and convenient. This questionnaire was directed to parole board
chairmen in all federal and state jurisdictions. 60.7% returned answers. Originals of all
answers are on file in the offices of the Michigan Law Review.
Michigan, however, should be included among those jurisdictions lacking an effective
administrative transfer process. Although there is the transfer statute cited above, overcrowding at Ionia State Hospital for the Criminally Insane has made such transfers possible only on an ineffectual body-for-body basis. See "200 Psychotics To Quit Prison,"
Ann Arbor News, Jan. 6, 1961, p. 2, col. 4, for an example of such an exchange proposed
on an extraordinary scale. A 1952 census indicates that few qualified personnel are available in penal institutions to make the evaluations on which such transfers would be based.
See Wille, Psychiatric Facilities in Prisons and Correctional Institutions in the United
States, 114 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 481 (1957).
10 Twenty-six of thirty replies to questionnaires (note 9 supra) answered affirmatively the question, "Have you noticed any significant number of prisoners come up for
parole whom you considered to be mentally ill?" Two of these questionnaires also reported
subsequent manifestations of mental illness among parolees. At the other extreme, one
answer quoted a parole board psychologist: " 'The number of cases of dynamical schizophrenia functionally able to carry on both in prison and in society constitutes about 15%
of all the cases I see in any given month. Most of these are diagnosed as passive-aggressive
or schizoid personalities. Psychopathic personalities form a relatively high percentage of
cases and are, of course, regarded to be without mental illness.'"
11 Administrative standards for the granting of parole are far from uniform in the
various jurisdictions. See Krasner, Hoodlum Priest and Respectable Convicts, Harper's
Magazine, Feb. 1961, p. 57, at 60. Michigan statistics indicate that 85% to 90% of all
prisoners released are first released on parole. See Killinger, Parole and Services to the
Discharged Offender, in TAPPAN, CONTEMPORARY Coruu:cnoN 361, 365 (1951), for arguments in favor of a liberal parole policy. In contrast, one state replying to the questionnaire, supra note 9, reported that its conservative parole policy precluded parole for the
mentally ill and hence avoided the problem of their return. Another indicated that it

1961]

COMMENTS

1103

such convicts are therefore granted parole. Thus the criminal
process thrusts upon parole administrators the problem of handling these victims of serious mental illness. This study by a psychiatrist and a law student is based upon the case histories of twelve
such parolees with whose mental illness the Michigan parole administration was forced to deal. These case histories are contained
in the appendix.12

L

THE MENTALLY ILL IN THE PAROLE SYSTEM

When he begins parole, the mentally ill parolee returns to an
environment which provides greater scope for manifestations of
his illness than did the severely circumscribed routine of prison
life. He may return to the same surroundings that bred his initial
disturbance,1 3 and he may face these surroundings after possible
deterioration in prison.14 Thus the chances for the appearance of
bizarre manifestations of his mental illness increase. In dealing
with these manifestations, parole administrators - especially parole
officers - must fill difficult and conflicting roles of counselor and
policeman,15 one role emphasizing the individual welfare of parolees, the other emphasizing public safety. Unlike participants
had just twelve penitentiary parolees, all of whom seemed quite sane. It should be pointed
out, however, that denial of parole to those of marginal mental illness merely forestalls
the problem of dealing with them effectively, leaving them in the meantime as an administrative problem within the prisons and perhaps contributing to their deterioration.
12 This sample was taken over a nine-month period. It includes all parolees who
were returned during that time either on medical warrants or on violation warrants with
immediate referral to the Psychiatric Clinic. Individual cases are arranged within the
appendix alphabetically by last initial. The trial record, prison reports, clinical history,
and parole record of each individual were examined, and this examination was supplemented in each case by psychiatric interviews. This material was also supplemented by
questionnaires. See note 9 supra.
13 See especially J.B., A.G., N.E., C.J., E.T., and N.W., appendix.
14" 'Your hands are tied. You just sit and look at those poor devils getting worse
every day••. .'" Dr. David P. Phillips, M.D., psychiatrist in the Michgan Department
of Corrections, quoted in MARTIN, BREAK DoWN nm WALLS 65 (1954). "'At least five
hundred men in Jackson now should be in a hospital . . . • Thousands more should be
treated and rehabilitated. ·we're sending men out worse than they came in.'" Gregory F.
Miller, former staff psychologist at State Prison of Southern Michigan, quoted id. at 65.
See the appendix histories of N.E. and A.K.
11> See Johnson, The Parole Supervisor in the Role of Stranger, 50 J. CRI?lr. L., C. & P.S.
38 (1959); GIARDINI, THE PAROLE PROCESS 241-48 (1959). Politics and adverse newspaper
publicity increase this difficulty. See l\fARnN, op. cit. supra note 14, at 195-97. The
parole officer often must face the ethical problems created by parolee's offering information in confidence. See PR. and C.J., appendix. A breach of professional confidence in
the conviction process of a capital case may be a violation of due process. See People v.
Leyra, 302 N.Y. 353, 98 N.E.2d 553 (1951). A similar conclusion has been reached in the
commitment of a criminal sexual psychopath, People v. Wasker, 353 Mich. 447, 91 N.W.2d
866 (1958). See generally Little & Strecker, Moot Questions in Psychiatric Ethics, 113 AM.
J. PSYCHIATRY 455 (1956).
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in the trial process who may categorize an individual and send
him away, parole administrators must continue to live -with their
decisions.16 Although parole officers commonly deal, often quite
perceptively, with the degree of mental illness which apparently
underlies most criminality,17 few are professionally equipped to
cope with a parolee displaying an extreme manifestation of mental
illness such as catatonic schizophrenia.18 The parole officer's lay
reaction to such a parolee seems often to be one of anxiety and
alarm, occasionally fed by unprofessional counsel from psychiatric
institutions.19 By initiating, as did the parole officers in the appendix cases, the summary administrative process to return the
alarm-producing parolee safely to prison, parole officers may at
least forestall whatever immediate harm might occur, thus utilizing administrative routine as an escape from anxiety. The rationale for such returns is strikingly similar to that for a mental commitment; an individual's freedom is taken away because of possible
danger to himself and his community arising from his mental illness. The methodology, however, is strikingly dissimilar, both in
its lack of professional guidance and of procedural safeguards, and
in its use of inappropriate penal institutions as places of detention.
II.

THE MENTALLY ILL IN THE PENAL SYSTEM

Alone this problem of mental parole returns appears persistent
but relatively insignificant; 20 nevertheless, it is important for bring16 For a discussion of similar problems faced by psychiatrists in the release of persons
committed under criminal insanity statutes, see Goldstein & Katz, Dangerousness and
Mental Illness-Some Observations on the Decision To Release Persons Acquitted by
Reason of Insanity, 70 YALE L.J. 225 (1960).
17 In support of this view, see Roche, Criminality and Mental Illness - Two Faces
of the Same Coin, 22 U. Cm. L. REv. 324 (1955); Showstack, Preliminary Report on the
Psychiatric Treatment of Prisoners at the California Medical Facility, 112 AM. J. PsYCHIATRY 821 (1956).
18 See appendix case C.S.
19 See, e.g., P.H. and C.J., appendix.
20 During the period 1956-1960, there were from 9 to 18 such returns each year in
Michigan. The responses to questionnaires, note 9 supra, indicate that occasional prob•
lems of mental illness among parolees are almost universally experienced and that suspension or revocation of parole is an available solution in most jurisdictions. Of the jurisdictions responding 26 answered affirmatively and only 4 answered negatively the question,
"Has your board experienced incidents among parolees of mentally disturbed behavior
that does not amount to a violation?" Nineteen answered affirmatively the question, "Is
it customary in your jurisdiction to issue return warrants for parolees behaving in a
manner that suggests mental illness?" Several of these jurisdictions stated that such returns
were rare or were used only in the event of inability to have the parolee committed to a
mental institution. Twelve indicated that returns actually caused by manifestations of
mental illness were formally based on "technical violations" of parole rules which might
otherwise have been ignored. See notes 79-81 infra and accompanying text. Seven jurildictions followed a special "medical" or "psychological" return procedure.
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ing into sharp relief the questions which lie behind it. No more
than twenty known psychotics or borderline psychotics are among
Michigan's parole returns each year, but some 300 to 500 more
remain behind walls in the Michigan penal system.21 Because it
appears that trial courts will inevitably continue to feed more
victims of various degrees of mental illness into the penal system, 22 there is little likelihood that their numbers will decrease.
Although the problem is enormous, it has been the subject of
little serious attention from the courts, the legal profession, or the
behavioral scientists. The mental parole return process, however,
presents on a more manageable scale the paradox of all mentally ill
convicts - criminality and mental illness mixed in a manner which
often defies simple categorization.23 In addition to protecting a
relatively small number of parolees from possible injustice, judicial
intervention into such returns would forcefully direct legal thinking toward this intermixture in a setting which is devoid of a criminal trial's emotionalism, rigidity, and compulsion to categorize, but
which provides an element of justiciability otherwise lacking in
the mentally ill convict's course through the penal system. Although the retention of the mentally ill in possibly inappropriate
penal institutions may be beyond direct judicial examination, its
conscious perpetuation by means of mental parole returns is not.
Invalidation of such returns, if in fact they are illegal, would at
the very least provide penal and mental health administrators
,;\Tith a judicial formulation of aims for dealing ,;\Tith problems of
intermixed criminality and mental illness. By releasing individuals
who, under immediate considerations, should not go free, courts
might encourage less accessible legislative and administrative
bodies to provide more acceptable facilities, personnel, and administrative machinery for the handling of mentally ill convicts.24
The final answer to the question whether a mentally ill parolee
should be returned to the penal system - and more broadly, of
course, whether mentally ill convicts should be there at all - de21 See generally MARTIN, op. cit. supra note 14, at 48, 62-80; MacCormick, Behind the
Prison Riots, 293 ANNALS 17 (1954).
22 See text accompanying notes 3-5 supra.
23 A similar paradox may be encountered in the mixed consideration of treatment and
public safety which bear upon the decision to release an individual committed to a
hospital as criminally insane. See Hough v. United States, 271 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
Compare Szasz, Civil Liberties and Mental Illness, 131 J. NERvous AND MENTAL DISEASES
58 (1960), with Goldstein 8: Katz, supra note 16.
2~ Compare the use of direct negative judicial action to achieve an indirect positive
result under the federal exclusionary rule, Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914);
cf. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), in which the Court recognized as largely illusory
the proposition that civil and criminal sanctions would prevent search and seizure abuses.
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pends in part upon an examination of the aims and capabilities
of the institutions within the penal system itself. Theorists generally advance four aims to justify the forms of imprisonment
traditionally meted out to those convicted of crimes: retribution,
deterrence, rehabilitation, and incapacitation.25 Acceptance of
one aim does not preclude acceptance of the others and, unfortunately, the various aims often dictate conflicting results even in
the handling of more mentally-normal convicts.
In spite of the vogue of minimizing the importance of retribution in most contemporary rationales of penology, this is the aspect
of imprisonment of which convicts themselves seem most aware and which they may even pathologically demand. 26 In the abstract
retribution seems entwined with the existence of free will: society
punishes an individual because he has consciously chosen to commit a forbidden act.27 Even if there is in fact an element of free
will in some criminal behavior, when mental illness has limited
an individual's will to at most only a token range of rational choice,
retribution for prohibited choices becomes difficult indeed to justify.28 Furthermore, as Professor Weihofen suggests, most members
of society probably have little desire to punish the mentally ill,
but the wrong-doer's derangement must be extreme to overcome
darker, less rational forces directed toward punishment.29 Perhaps some rationally-conceived punishment may be justifiable to
deter or to reform. 30 But the retribution which sends mentally ill
convicts to prison seems directed more toward society's fears of its
25 See generally MICHAEL &: WECHSLER, CRIMINAL I.Aw AND ITS ADMINISTRATION 6-16
(1940). Some foreign jurisdictions attempt to diversify their institutions according to the
purpose each is supposed to accomplish. See Radzinowic:z, The Persistent Offender,
7 CA.MB. L.J. 68, 72-79 (1939).
:26 See Goldstein, supra note 4, at 544 n.4. See generally text accompanying notes
38-40 infra.
:27 See MICHAEL &: WECHSLER, op. cit. supra note 25, at 8 n.15.
28 For recent capital cases in which alleged mental illness did not prevent execution,
see Caritativo v. California, 357 U.S. 549 (1958); United States ex rel. Smith v. Baldi, 344
U.S. 561 (1953); Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9 (1950); Phyle v. Duffy, 334 U.S. 431
(1948). Note especially the dissents in all four cases by Mr. Justice Frankfurter. But cf.
Forthoffer v. Swope, 103 F.2d 707, 709 (9th Cir. 1939) (dictum). See generally Michaelsen,
Post-Conviction Due Process Regarding Insanity Claim Prior to Execution, 41 J. CRIM. L.,
C. &: P.S. 639 (1951). If insanity does not stand in way of execution, which is surely
punishment in its barest form, then it apparently does not raise due process questions
about imprisonment, in which punishment is but one of several elements. Furthermore,
imprisonment does not foreclose defenses which an individual might raise upon recovery
of his rationality.
29 See WEIHOFEN, op. cit. supra note 4, at 136.
so See id. at 146.
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own impulses than toward those of the convicts.31 Aside from the
broad question of the initial justifiability of retribution, however,
the very act of granting parole seems an admission that the need
of retribution has been spent. It then appears especially irrational
to remobilize this retribution upon manifestations of mental illness
during parole.
The darker motivations of retribution are often rationalized
in terms of deterrence of criminal behavior, a negative attempt at
rehabilitation. Fear of more retribution is thought to deter not
only the recipient but also others who observe. However, serious
doubt has been cast on the effect of deterrence upon any potentially criminal mind, which readily rationalizes that only ineffectual criminals get caught.32 Imprisonment is especially unlikely
to deter the mentally ill convict himself, whose manner of connecting cause and effect may be irrational and who may even pathologically seek to be punished. The deterrent aspect of imprisoning the mentally ill, weak as it is at the outset, is weaker still in
the mental parole return. The immediate cause for return is mental illness, from which the parolee obviously cannot be deterred.
Although the state has gained its power over the parolee through
his criminal conviction for an act which may arguably have been
deterrable, the causal connection between the past deterrable act
and the parole return is too tenuous to have serious impact on an
irrational mind. The result upon others may be the very reverse
of a deterrent; a legal act whose caprice provides potential criminals
with an example of real or apparent unfairness helps them to turn
their ordinary criminal acts against a capricious society into acts of
imagined gallantry.33
At once the most humanitarian and utilitarian aim of penology
is rehabilitation,34 which is supposed to benefit the convict him31 See STEPHEN, A GENERAL VIEW OF THE CRIMINAL I.Aw OF ENGLAND 99 (1863);
STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 478, and 2 id. 81-82 (1883). See
generally WEIHOFEN, op. cit. supra note 4, at 138-46.
32 See REDL &: WINE!IIAN, CHILDREN WHO HATE 126, 205 (1951); WEIHOFEN, op. cit.
supra note 4, at 150-51.
33 See REDL &: WINEMAN, op. cit. supra note 32, at 165-77.
34 Attempts to rehabilitate appear not to be mandatory even in a commitment avowedly for treatment. See In re Kemmerer, 309 Mich. 313, 15 N.W.2d 652 (1944), cert. denied,
329 U.S. 767 (1946); Kemmerer v. Benson, 165 F.2d 702 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 334 U.S.
849 (1948); cases under the Michigan Criminal Sexual Psychopath Act, MICH. CoMP.
LAws §§ 780.501-.507 (Supp. 1956). Similar cases are collected in Annot., 24 A.L.R.2d
350 (1952). But see In re Maddox, 351 Mich. 358, 88 N.W.2d 470 (1958), which invalidated
the use of prisons as places of detention for those committed under the Michigan Criminal Sexual Psychopath Act, possibly in recognition of the role played by the mentally ill
in the 1952 Jackson riots. See text accompanying notes 41-42 infra.

ll08

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 59

self, the community to which he will return, and in the meantime
even the prison society in which he is kept. More a goal than a
present reality on any appreciable scale,35 rehabilitation presents
difficult challenges even with relatively normal prisoners. It appears that retribution dominates most prisoners' conception of
prison, whatever their degree of sanity.36 The sullen submissiveness engendered by an atmosphere of retribution37 interferes with
rehabilitative counseling in a prison setting, both in cases of extreme mental illness and in those more normal. The greater the
barrier of hostility and negativism between prisoner and counselor,
the less likely the counselor will be to disturb the irrationally delinquent patterns of the prisoner's mental processes, and the more
illusory rehabilitation therefore becomes.38 Likewise, the more
irrational the administrative process by which a mentally ill person is brought into, or back into, prison, the more easily he may
throw this irrationality into the face of attempts to reorient him
to the rational community. Those responsible for rehabilitation
regard the burden of "feeding and watering" the hopelessly
disturbed as an undesirable distraction from dealing effectively
with the more salvable general prison population. Although mental parole return warrants are often worded in terms of treatment
of the parolee, the returnee's prospects of success in a prison setting, like those of mentally ill convicts in general, are quite slim.30
Even if rehabilitation is illusory, it may be argued that imprisonment and parole returns of mentally ill convicts at least fulfill
the final aim of preventing them from harming their neighbors.
Even if the possible harm has been realistically appraised, whatever
utilitarian force this argument carries in the short run fails when
it is considered that this incapacitation is no more than a stopgap
limited by the length of the convict's maximum sentence. Release
after a flat maximum sentence bears no relationship to the prisoner's ability to cope with life in responsible society. He may even
have deteriorated during his sentence.40 It may be argued that
35 See MARTIN, op. cit. supra note 14, at 231-44. But cf. Showstack, supra note 17.
36 See generally Johnston, Sources of Distortion and Deception in Prison Interviewing,
20 Fed. Prob., March 1956, p. 43.
37 See McCorckle 8: Korn, Resocialization Within Walls, 293 ANNALS 88 (1954).
38 For a discussion in terms of the "delinquent ego," which by its nature throws up
barriers against any attempt to penetrate its delinquency, see REDL 8: WINEMAN, op. cit.
supra note 32, at 165-77.
30 Unavailability of personnel or lack of prospect for success may bring about abandonment of treatment. See A.C., P.H., and N.W., appendix.
·
40 See note 14 supra. Weihofen points out that if the length of time spent in detention provides the public with any comfort, mental commitments generally last longer than
prison sentences actually served. WEIHOFEN, op. cit. supra note 4, at 134-35.
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civil commitment upon completion of a full maximum sentence
is not an uncommon practice, and that this practice reduces the
spectre of unjustified end-of-sentence releases. On the other hand,
this practice strongly suggests what might better have been done in
the first place.41 Whatever disposition is made of mentally ill prisoners at the end of their sentences, as long as they remain in an inadequately diversified penal system they present serious administrative problems-a burden both on the more nearly normal prisoners
who must live with them and on prison administrators, for whom
mentally ill prisoners are a source of constant volatility giving rise
both to irritating incidents of petty friction and to explosive outbursts like the Jackson Prison riots of 1952.42 By any test, the seriously disturbed do not belong in contemporary prisons. The
courts may begin to face this problem by attacking the mental
parole return process which consciously perpetuates the imprisonment of the mentally ill. The final goal, however, should be the
formulation of an entire system of justice which will deal more
adequately with those who are both "criminal" and "insane."

III.

THE ADMINISTRATIVE

p AROLE

RETURN PROCESS

The parole systems, presenting the observer ·with an opportunity for further examination of these questions, deal with both
normal and disturbed parolees in an almost total vacuum of safeguards against administrative caprice. Statutory delegations of
power to parole boards are universally broad and it is the parole
board itself which usually formulates the basic regulations governing the behavior of parolees.43 Required standards of behavior
may be varied to fit the nature of individual parolees, and in practice parole officers exercise discretion in choosing whether to enforce particular regulations against individual parolees.44 Legisla41 Michigan is especially hampered in this respect by MICH. CoMP. LAws § 330.40
(1948) which requires that any person who has ever been convicted of a crime may only
be committed to the overburdened State Hospital for the Criminally Insane. It is doubtful
that this provision is always observed. See the cases of J.B., E.T., and N.TV., appendix.
42 See MacCormick, Behind the Prison Riots, 293 .ANNALS 17 (1954). There were
probably about 300 committable psychotics in the Jackson Prison in 1952 and 200 more
who were borderline psychotics. See MARTIN, BREAK DoWN THE WALLS 48, 62-80 (1953).
See generally id. at 3-106.
48 E.g., MICH. CoMP. LAws § 791.233 (Supp. 1956). The statute of South Dakota,
S.D. ConE § 13.5307 (Supp. 1960), is unusual in its provision of specific detailed regulations, but the parole board is empowered to provide additional regulations.
44 Compare von Hentig, Degrees of Parole Violation and Graded Remedial Measures,
33 J. CRIM. L., C. & P.S. 363 (1943), with Bates, On the Uses of Parole Restrictions, 33. J.
CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 435 (1943). See also Goldstein, supra note 4, for a discussion of the analogous question of police officers' discretion in the enforcement and non-enforcement of laws.
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tive standards for parole revocation are often worded in a manner
which encourages subjective prediction of the parolee's future
behavior, thereby providing few objective criteria upon which
judicial review might be founded. 45 One state's statute expressly
forbids judicial review of revocation proceedings.46 Statutorily
prescribed procedural requirements for revocation vary between
complete absence of any provision for hearing at one extreme47
to provision for full hearing with the right to be represented by
counsel and to present witnesses at the other.48 Intermediate jurisdictions prescribe personal appearance by the parolee before the
board, but without counsel and in many jurisdictions without
witnesses. 49
45 Five states provide the very general standard "to have lapsed or to be about to
lapse into criminal ways." Aruz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 31-415 (1956); IND. ANN. STAT. § 18-249
(1956); N.J. REv. STAT. § 2A:167-9 (1951); but see N.J. REv. STAT. § 30:4-111 (1987); N.Y.
CoRREC. LAws § 216 (Supp. 1960); TENN. CoDE ANN. § 40-3617 (1955). In California the
board must show "cause," CAL. PEN. CoDE § 3063; in Minnesota its purpose must be to
prevent escape or "enforce discipline," MINN. STAT. ANN. § 637.06 (Supp. 1960). Some
other states set no verbal standard at all. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-126 (1960); IowA
CoDE § 247 (1958); NEV. REv. STAT. § 213-150 (Supp. 1959); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-62-17
(1953); Wis. STAT. § 57 .06 (3) (1959); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-326 (1957).
46 s.c. CODE § 55-616 (1952).
4T ARK. STAT. § 43-2808 (1947); CAL. PEN. CODE § 3060; COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §
39-18-4 (1953); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-126 (1960); IOWA CODE § 247.9 (1958); ME.
REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 149, § 49 (1954); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 127, § 149 (1957); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 637.06 (Supp. 1960); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 549.265 (Supp. 1960); NEB. REv
STAT. § 29.262 (Supp. 1959); NEv. REv. STAT. § 213.150 (Supp. 1959); N.J. REv. STAT.
§ 2A:167-11 (1951); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 148-61.1 (1958); N.D. REv. CODE ANN. § 12-55-25
(1960); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2965.21 (Baldwin 1958) (board may, however, establish
its own hearing requirement); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, § 346 (1950); ORE. REv. STAT.
§ 144.370 (Supp. 1959); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 13-8-18 (1956); S.D. CODE § 13.5307 (Supp.
1960); Troe. CoDE CR111r. PROC. art. 781d, § 22 (Supp. 1960); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-62-17
(1953); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 904 (1959); VA. CoDE ANN. § 53-262 (1958); WIS. STAT.
§ 57.06(3) (1959); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-326 (1957). In a few of these states there may
be a right to hearing not based on the statute. See Annot., 29 A.L.R.2d 1074 (1953).
DAVIS, An11nNISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE § 7.16 at 489 n.9 (1958), suggests that this tendency
may be increasing. 9 W. REs. L. REV. 234 (1958) argues that summary return procedures
desirably encourage the parole of marginal candidates, although no data is cited in sup•
port of this contention. Certainly Michigan, with one of the most liberal return hearing
requirements also has one of the highest proportions of parole grants. See note 11 supra.
48 ALA. CODE tit. 42, § 12 (1940); FLA. STAT. § 947.23 (1959); MD. ANN. CODE art. 41,
§ 115 (1957); MICH. Co11rP. LAws § 791.240 (Supp. 1956); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 949835 (Supp. 1959); W. VA. CODE ANN § 6291 (26) (Supp. 1960); D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-206
(1951). Failure to explain the right to counsel invalidated revocation proceedings in
Moore v. Reid, 246 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1957). Interviews with the Michigan Parole Board
indicate that Michigan returnees rarely exercise their statutory right to counsel.
49 Aruz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 31-417 (1956); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 7714 (1953); GA.
CoDE ANN. § 77-519 (Supp. 1958); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 20-228-29 (1947); ILL. REv. STAT.
ch. 38, § 808 (1959); IND. ANN. STAT. § 13-251 (1956); KANS. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 62-2248-50
(Supp. 1959); KY. REv. STAT. § 439.440 (Supp. 1960); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15:574.9
(Supp. 1960); MISS. CoDE ANN. § 4004-13 (1956); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 607:46 (1955);
N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-17-27, 28 (Supp. 1959); N.Y. CoRREc. LAw § 218 (Supp. 1960); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 331-2la (Supp. 1960); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-3619 (1955); WASH.
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Since the inception of parole late in the nineteenth century
as an extension of the pardoning power,150 courts have made few
equal protection or due process inroads upon the statutory scheme
of parole. Parole is generally treated as an act of administrative
grace, an extramural continuation of imprisonment, or a contract
between the parolee and the state, subject under any theory only
to the most limited review.61 However, occasional remedies may
be given for departures from statutory standards for parole revocation, either by habeas corpus in state or federal courts52 or by
mandamus in a court having supervisory jurisdiction over the
parole board.53 Nevertheless, even where there are no substantive
or procedural guarantees contained in statutes, courts have suggested at least in dicta a willingness to intervene upon a showing
of capriciousness.54

IV.

JURISDICTIONAL ATTACKS

The most legitimate legal attack against a parole return
brought about by mental illness appears to be based on equal
protection. Such returns are very closely analogous to commitment
REv. ConE § 9.95.120 (Supp. 1959); 18 U.S.C. § 4207 (1958). Denial of a request to be
represented by counsel in a revocation hearing has been held not to be a denial of due
process under the fifth amendment. Lopez v. Madigan, 174 F. Supp. 919 (N.D. Calif.
1959); 108 U. PA. L. REv. 423 (1960).
50See generally GIARDINI, THE PAROLE PROCESS 5-16 (1959). Michigan was probably
the first state to experiment with parole. See Pub. Acts 1869, No. 145, § 5, providing
indeterminate sentences for prostitution. The more general successor to the 1869 legisla•
tion, Pub. Acts 1889, No. 228, was declared unconstitutional under the 1850 Michigan
Constitution because of its asserted invasion of the pardoning power, People v. Cummings,
88 Mich. 249, 50 N.W. 310 (1891). Article V, section 28, of the 1908 constitution annulled
this decision.
51 See, e.g., In re Casella, 313 Mich. 393, 21 N.W.2d 175 (1946), in which the Michigan
court reversed a lower court's habeas corpus decision which had released a returnee on
the grounds of the parole board's failure to show cause for his arrest. But see In re
Colin, 337 Mich. 491, 60 N.W.2d 431 (1953), in which the discharge of a returnee was
upheld after his arrest on a return warrant for a parole violation twenty-seven years
earlier, during which period the state had twice failed to exercise its right of detainer
while the prisoner was held in other jurisdictions. See generally Note, 65 HAR.v. L. REv.
309 (1951); Annot., 29 A.L.R.2d 1074 (1953).
52 Fleenor v. Hammond, 116 F.2d 982 (6th Cir. 1941); habeas corpus to a state
prisoner on the theory that parole is a vested right and its revocation requires procedural
protection. See also In re Colin, supra note 51. Contra, Hiatt v. Compagna, 178 F.2d 42
(5th Cir. 1949), afj'd per curiam, 340 U.S. 880 (1950); In re Varner, 166 Ohio St. 340, 142
N.E.2d 846 (1957). See generally DAVIS, AnMINISrRATIVE LAw TREATISE § 7.16 (1958).
153 See United States ex rel. Nicholson v. Dillard, 102 F.2d 94, 96 (4th Cir. 1939);
United States ex rel. Rowe v. Nicholson, 78 F.2d 468, 471 (4th Cir.) cert. denied, 296
U.S. 573 (1935). Robbins v. Reed, 269 F.2d 242 (D.C. Cir. 1959), is an unusual case involving use of declaratory judgment procedure to review a departure from statutory form.
54 E.g., Anderson v. Alexander, 191 Ore. 409, 440, 229 P .2d 633, 642 (1951).
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for mental illness since both are based on the possible danger that
the parolee's mental illness creates for himself and his community.
Yet the mental health issue was either not raised at the parolee's
initial conviction or, if it was raised, the state successfully asserted
at least a minimum degree of mental health.55 In contrast, at the
juncture of parole revocation the state has reversed its ground by
asserting in effect that the parolee's mental health is in serious
doubt. The result, as in a commitment proceeding based on considerations of public safety, is custody but, unlike commitment,
custody in a penal institution. In contrast to summary administrative re-imprisonment, Michigan law, which is typical in this respect, provides four statutory procedures under which a mentally
ill member of the general population may be placed into indeterminate custody: civil commitment,56 criminal commitment on
a finding of incompetence to stand trial on a criminal charge,51
criminal commitment after a successful criminal defense of insanity,58 and commitment as a criminal sexual psychopath collateral to a criminal proceeding.59 The first of these procedures
generally results in placement in any of several state hospitals; 00 the
last three, in the State Hospital for the Criminally Insane at Ionia.
Whether he is adjudged "civilly" or "criminally" insane, an individual committed under any of these four laws is placed under
the jurisdiction of the Department of Mental Health, not the Department of Corrections. 61 Each of these statutes attempts to
provide definite substantive standards, administered by rigid procedures. Because of the availability of statutory grounds for
release of persons improperly committed under the statutes, 62 the
Michigan court has never reached due process arguments in mental
55 See text accompanying notes 4-6 supra. A conceivable exception would be where
the court raises a competency question, the defendant successfully asserts his competency,
and a conviction follows.
56 MICH. CoMP. LAws §§ 330.20-.21 (Supp. 1956).
51MICH. COMP. LAws § 767.27 (1948).
58Jbid.
59 MICH. CoMP. LAws §§ 780.501-.507 (Supp. 1956).
60 If an individual who is civilly committed has been convicted of a crime at any
time, it is required by statute that he be committed to the State Hospital for the Criminally Insane. MICH. COMP. LAws § 330.40 (1948). But see note 41 supra.
61 MICH. COMP. LAws § 330.11 (Supp. 1956), § 330.40 (1948).
62Civil commitment: In re Allison, 336 Mich. 316, 58 N.W.2d 90 (1953); In re Fuller,
334 Mich. 566, 55 N.W.2d 96 (1952); People v. Backhaut, 312 Mich. 707, 20 N.W.2d 780
(1945); In re Gordon, 301 Mich. 224, 3 N.W.2d 253 (1942). Criminal Sexual Psychopath
Act: People v. Wasker, 353 Mich. 447, 91 N.W.2d 866 (1958); In re Irvine, 351 Mich. I, 87
N.W.2d 103 (1957); In re Carter, 337 Mich. 496, 60 N.W.2d 433 (1953); In re Kelmar,
323 Mich. 511, 35 N.W.2d 476 (1949).
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commitments. 63 The very existence of statutory commitment
processes for the general population would seem, however, to
raise questions of equal protection in the handling of mentally ill
parolees. Is it rational to provide for mentally ill parolees a special
summary procedure leading to "commitment" in prison, while
similarly disordered people who are not also parolees are committed to hospitals under statutory safeguards? If the parolee's initial conviction may be said to have related at all to his mental condition, it was an affirmation of his sanity. It seems not only unfair
but also illogical to use that conviction as the basis of jurisdiction
for what is in effect a special form of mental commitment. Moreover, an analogous equal protection argument was successfully
used to invalidate classification aspects of the Michigan sterilization
statutes, which applied only to institutionalized defectives.64
An additional collateral attack might be based on the differences between the commitment statutes,65 which are specific in
their grants of power to the courts and limit them in their substantive standards and procedures, on the one hand, and the Michigan
legislature's general delegation of powers to the Parole Board on the
other. 66 It might be argued that the legislature, not foreseeing the
serious intermixture of mental illness and penal administration,
intended that confinement for reasons of mental illness should be
governed entirely by the specific delegation of power to the courts
and not in part by the very general delegation to the Parole
Board. 67 In Michigan, however, this argument lacks force, for the
statutory provision for the care of mentally ill prisoners before they
might be paroled68 suggests that the legislature did in fact foresee the commingling of mental and penal problems in the parole
process. So too does the existence of a separate Psychiatric Clinic
within Jackson Prison. In support of an opposite conclusion, however, a Michigan Attorney General's opinion states that commitment of a parolee under the Criminal Sexual Psychopath Act, 69
which commitment was intended to stand in lieu of punishment,
63 But see Shields v. Shields, 26 F. Supp. 211 (W.D. Mo. 1939).
6i Smith v. Wayne Probate Judge, 231 Mich. 409, 204 N.W. 140

(1925). A previous
version of the same statute had been invalidated in Haynes v. Lapeer, 201 Mich. 138, 166
N.W. 938 (1918).
65 See notes 56-59 supra.
66 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 791.233 (Supp. 1956).
67 See generally 2 SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSIRUCrION § 5204 (3d ed. 1943).
68 MICH. COMP. LAws § 791.233 (Supp. 1956). Cf. CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 39-18-6
to -9 (Supp. 1957), which makes the parole board responsible for initiating commitment
proceedings for parole candidates whose sanity appears doubtful.
60 MICH. COMP. LAws §§ 780.501-.507 (Supp. 1956).
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not only should prevent fresh sentencing for the acts bringing
about the commitment but also should prevent parole revocation
on the same grounds.70 By invoking a statutory absolution of
criminal responsibility to prevent revocation of parole, the opinion
treats the two remedies as inconsistent. It is implicit in this
analysis that the legislature meant parole revocation to remain
primarily a sanction against responsible misbehavior, not an
auxiliary means of accomplishing the same ends as commitment.

V.

PROCEDURAL REFORMS WITHIN THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS

Even if these collateral attacks on the board's jurisdiction to
hear mental cases fail, as well they might if more appropriate
mental institutions were to become available within the penal
system, sound policy dictates a modification of revocation procedures to provide fair handling of victims of mental illness.
Courts may be able to implement this policy by means of statutory
construction or, on narrow grounds, by constitutional attack.
Analogy71 to the specific statutes governing court commitments
might require that even if the parole board may "commit" parolees
back into the penal system, in doing so they must follow standards
similar to those provided by the commitment statutes for the
guidance of courts.72 Although the commitment statutes establish
requirements for professional guidance that are not entirely uniform - the strictest requirement being the testimony of three
psychiatrists required by the Criminal Sexual Psychopath Act73
and the minimum of two "reputable physicians and other credible witnesses" 74 required for criminal commitment - there is at
least a statutory pattern requiring some competent testimony regarding mental condition in support of commitments. To be consistent with this pattern, parole boards too should be required to
hear a minimum of competent evidence. Procedurally, such evidence should be of facts, not conclusions, as specifically required by
70 [1947-1948] MICH. ATIY. GEN. BIENNIAL REP. 710. This opinion seems not to have
been tested in the courts, since in actual parole administration its effect has been avoided
by predicating return upon a technical violation of parole regulations - failure to inform
of whereabouts, excessive drinking etc. - at the time of the events leading to the Criminal
Sexual Psychopath finding.
71 For a discussion of this judicial technique, see Stone, The Common Law in
the United States, 50 HARV. L. R.Ev. 4, 13 (1936); Frank, Civil Law Influences on the
Common Law - Some Reflections on "Comparative" and "Contrastive" Law, 104 U.
PA. L. R.Ev. 887, 889 (1956).
72 See generally 2 SUTHERLAND, op. cit. supra note 67, § 4702.
73 MICH. CoMP. LAws § 780.504 (Supp. 1956).
74MICH. CoMP. LAws § 7672.7 (1948).

1961]

COMMENTS

1115

the civil commitment75 and sexual psychopathic76 statutes and as
impliedly required by the word "testify" in the incompetencyinsanity statute.77 Each statute requires testimony and crossexamination in an open hearing at which the subject is present
with right to counsel, a pattern with which Michigan parole
revocation practice, but not that of many other jurisdictions, is
consistent.78 In general, if it must be allowed at all, a parole return
because of mental illness should be by a rational process designed
to protect the parolee's interests, even if his freedom is no more
than a privilege.
If special procedural rights are to govern parole returns because of mental illness, returns of this kind must, of course, be
identified. Lip-service to any of a number of technical parole
violations may obscure the real reasons for the return of a mentally
ill parolee.79 Indeed, "Failure to keep parole officer informed of
whereabouts at all times," which appears on many parole violation
reports, is very nearly a blank check.80 So also is "excessive [or in
many states, "any"] use of alcoholic beverages."81 "Leaving the
assigned county," another frequently-reported violation, may be
an intentional flaunting of regulations or it may be an ambiguous
tendency to wander that is symptomatic of mental disturbance.
To argue that the reason for a parolee's return may adequately be
so characterized, and his rights thereby determined, without a
requirement for a conscientious initial revocation inquiry,82 is
to ignore the obscurity of motives for urging return which arise
from the complex personal forces which mental illness sets in
motion among the parolee, his family,83 his community, and the
MICH. COMP. LAws § 330.2() (Supp. 1956).
MICH. Cm,fi'. l.Aws § 780.504 (Supp. 1956).
MICH. COMP. LAws § 767.2.7 (1948).
78 See text accompanying notes 54-55 supra.
79 See note 20 supra. Michigan generally uses a medical return, attempting thereby
to emphasize the non-punitive aspects of such a suspension. In theory all medical returns
are merely designed to provide treatment; for example, a parolee victim of appendicitis
might be returned to the prison hospital for his appendectomy. In reality, however, it is
difficult to escape the conclusion that a mentally ill parolee returned on a medical warrant
has been brought back primarily for custody. Significantly, such an individual is often
colloquially called a "medical parole violator." Treatment is not automatic. See, e.g., the
appendix case histories of A.C., P.H., C.O. and N.W., who were released to the general
prison population shortly after having been returned on medical warrants. Occasionally,
however, mentally ill Michigan parolees are returned on violation warrants. See, especially, the impasse reached in the case of JM. See also, e.g., C.J., A.K. and C.O., appendix.
80 But see the appendix case history of J.M.
81 See von Hentig, supra note 44, at 369-70.
82 See generally DAVIS, ADllUNISTRATIVE I.Aw TREATISE §§ 7.19·.20 (1958).
83 See, e.g., J.B., A.C., S.G. and N.W., appendix.
75
76
77
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parole officer himself.84 Procedural and substantive due process
are as inextricably intertwined here as they are in the commercial
proceedings where restraints on administrative caprice are more
firmly established.811
A right to procedural safeguards against administrative caprice
is not, however, completely dependent upon the mentally ill
parolee's return being characterized as the result of mental illness.
A requirement for special treatment may arise even in an outright
"violation" return. Unlike participants in more conventional administrative processes, who are generally quite able to protect their
own interests, a mentally ill parolee may be too irrational or
self-punishing to deny or explain the facts upon which his return
is founded. An administrative process involving so inept a primary
participant appears grossly unfair. To prevent advantage from
being taken of the parolee's mental inadequacy, the initial question
should be directed toward the parolee's ability to protect his own
interests. If this ability is found lacking, the parole board should
not proceed further in what would be a one-sided inquiry to fix
the stigma of parole violation. Instead, fairness dictates that the
question of violation should be left unanswered at least until an
adequate inquiry is possible, and that the parolee be treated or
institutionalized by whatever process is appropriate to his mental
illness. The rationale for this initial inquiry into the individual's
ability to protect his own interests is, of course, identical to that of
determining competency at the time of a criminal trial,86 but with
the important difference that the criminal trial deals with a defendant having a substantive right to be free, while the parolee's
freedom is said to be no more than a privilege granted by administrative grace.87 Nevertheless, even if there are in fact no substantive rights for mentally ill prisoners, there appears to be a trend
among due process decisions toward imposing requirements of fairness in administrative proceedings where mere privileges appear
84 See note 15 supra.
85 But see Anderson v.

Alexander, 191 Ore. 409, 419, 229 P .2d 633, 638 (1951) (dictum),
which promises to protect the parolee against caprice even without provision for a return
hearing. The forthright "medical return" used in Michigan and in several other jurisdictions, see notes 20 and 79 supra, is treated in Michigan as a suspension and not a
revocation of parole, so that as a matter of practice the statutory return hearing is not
offered. Although there is no problem of characterization of the return, the fact that
there is no hearing opens the possibility of unjustified returns brought about by interpersonal pressures.
86 See Comment, 9 MICH. L. REv. 1078 (1961).
87 See text accompanying notes 43-54 supra.
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to be in question.88 Even in dealing with prisoners, the power of
government begets a responsibility for it to justify its actions. Such
responsibility hardly seems fulfilled by a revocation hearing for an
irrational parolee accused of a violation.
Whatever precise mode of attack may succeed in eliminating or
modifying the mental parole return process, it will tend to introduce into the penal process a degree of rationality heretofore lacking, benefiting both the mentally ill parolees themselves and,
indirectly, the mentally ill prisoners who have not reached parole.
Contrary to the proposition that due process ends with the conviction of a criminal,80 the need for an appearance of rationality and
fairness remains at least as great during imprisonment and its related processes. This is especially true for the mentally ill prisoner,
for whom reality has already become distorted. Administrative
caprice plays into the pathology of a prisoner, whether he is labeled
"sane" or "insane." The more unfair he can make the law appear,
the more easily he may justify his own battle against the society
that the law represents.
David G. Davies, S. Ed.
John H. Hess, M.D.
88 Compare Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F,2d 46, 58 (D.C. Cir. 1950), afj'd per curiam,
341 U.S. 918 (1951): "Due process of law is not applicable unless one is being deprived
of something to which he has a right," with Slochower v. Board of Educ., 350 U.S. 551, 559
(1956): "This is not to say that Slochower has a constitutional right to be an associate
professor of German at Brooklyn College. The State has broad powers in the selection
and discharge of its employees, and it may be that proper inquiry would show Slochower's
continued employment to be inconsistent with a real interest of the State. But there has
been no such inquiry here. We hold that summary dismissal of appellant violates due
process of law." But cf. Beilan v. Board of Educ., 357 U.S. 399 (1958). See also United
States ex rel. Acardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954).
"The proposition may still be perfectly sound that one who lacks a 'right' to a government gratuity may nevertheless have a 'right' to fair treatment in the distribution of
the gratuity." DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7.12, at 456 (1958). See generally
id. § 7.12.
so For criticism of this notion, see Tappan, The Legal Rights of Prisoners, 293 ANNALS
99 (1954).
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.APPENDIX

Several general observations apply to all of the twelve returnees upon
whose cases this study was based.90 The crimes for which they were
initially convicted were all of a uniformly low order of criminal competence, and all but A.K.'s were of a non-violent nature. None of the
twelve were represented by private counsel. No serious consideration
appears to have been given to defenses based on mental illness even in the
three cases in which there is some suggestion that the possibility was recognized. Each of the twelve pleaded guilty at his trial. None has ever appealed or otherwise sought review of his conviction. .Beyond these generalizations, however, the cases vary widely in the degree and nature of
the maladies, the circumstances of return, and the treatment given after
return.

J.B.91
J.B. is a twenty-five-year-old male who was born on a farm in the
deep South. He had once previously been civilly committed to a state
mental hospital. He had also received treatment in federal mental institutions while serving time for mail theft, his one previous felony
conviction. On the advice of appointed counsel, J.B. pleaded guilty to
breaking and entering in the daytime and he was sentenced to two to five
years. After serving his minimum term, he was paroled to his matriarchal
family. He was unable to hold a job. After eight months of parole his
family attempted to have him civilly committed, but this proceeding failed
because of a technical defect. "Rather than subject [him] to the stress of
another civil proceeding," the parole officer recommended a medical
return to prison which was granted. J.B. remains in the Psychiatric Clinic
at present, although there appears to be little chance of his satisfactory
recovery. In his interviews he was unable to recall his abortive civil commitment and repetitiously asserted that his return resulted from a failure
to arrange properly for his driver's and chauffeur's licenses.
A.C.92
A.G., a garrulous thirty-year-old male, probably a fourth felony offender, was charged with larceny in a building. Apparently his appointed
counsel doubted A.C.'s competency to stand trial but abandoned the point
after a conference in chambers. A.G. pleaded guilty and received a two and
a quarter to four year sentence. He then attempted to escape from the
prison farm to which he had been committed, and upon his almost-immediate recapture, received an additional year and a half to four and a
half year term. While serving his combined terms, he was characterized
90 For
91 See
92 See

the source of this sample, see note 12
notes 13, 41, and 83 supra.
notes 13, 39, 79, and 83 supra.

supra.

1961]

COMMENTS

1119

as playing a "goofy kid" role to cover an underlying manner of extreme
distrust. Several incidents of friction, generally the result of clumsy attempts to be friendly, marked his stay in prison. He eventually reached
the Psychiatric Clinic and, because of difficulty in receiving psychiatric
clearance and in locating a home and job, was delayed in receiving parole
until he had served all but two years of his combined maximum sentences.
Eventually he was paroled in the custody of his mother and stepfather
although he had previously asked to be paroled to his father. His mother,
whom the parole officer described as "passive possessive," seemed only
mildly interested in having responsibility for her son, and it appears that
hostility between the two increased as his parole continued. He failed
to keep employment and began drinking excessively, both technical violations of parole standards which his parole officer tolerated. Then his
mother, although A.G. insists at his stepfather's instigation, complained to
his parole officer of two episodes in which A.G. had smashed furniture in
their apartment. The parole officer attempted to procure a psychiatric
evaluation, no records of which are available. Subsequently A.G. described
hallucinations of impending invasions from outer space and shortly afterward he was returned to prison on a medical warrant. Apparently visibly
relieved to be back in prison, he received brief treatment in the psychiatric
clinic and was placed in the general prison population.

N.E.9a
N.E. is a twenty-year-old male who is infatuated with automobiles.
He pleaded guilty to the unauthorized driving away of an automobile, his
first felony, although his record indicates a number of prior arrests for
minor offenses involving automobiles; local police regarded him as an
incorrigible troublemaker. He had neither finished school nor begun
any steady employment. Although there may have been discussion of his
mental state between his appointed counsel and the judge in chambers,
N.E. was convicted and received a year and a half to five year sentence
in the present case. He began his term at a reformatory farm where, after
an initially satisfactory adjustment, he anxiously complained about attacks
from homosexual fellow inmates and expressed a fear of violent death.
He was transferred to Jackson, where he received treatment at the Psychiatric Clinic, and was then returned to the farm. He was once denied
parole because of his treatment status. There is also some suggestion that
his family was not enthusiastic over the prospect of his return. They, however, became more receptive and N.E. was paroled to his parents. Almost
immediately he began to drink heavily and lost his job. He technically
violated parole by acquiring an automobile. He was arrested on a complaint of assault and battery and was found to be carrying a knife. The
charge was dropped at the preliminary hearing stage - possibly because
113 See

notes 13 and 14 supra.
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of the influence of his mother. A week later, however, his mother complained to the parole officer that N.E. had thrown an automobile generator at her when she interrupted his work and had smashed furniture
in the house on other occasions. As the cumulative result of these incidents, the parole officer decided to start violation return proceedings.
N .E. went to jail. There his behavior became extremely bizarre. "I don't
care what you do, just get these bugs off me." He also constantly washed,
fought, cried, and accused his jailers of having "killed my mother and
father and shipped them to Canada in a golden box." He awaited his parole
return, which was changed from a violation to a medical return, in
solitary confinement. His bizarre behavior continued after he reached
the Psychiatric Clinic at Jackson. Although in his interview, which
took place three months after his return, he was initially calm, even
flat in his responses, N.E. eventually reverted to complaints of "bugs,"
emotional accusations of killing his parents, excited reminiscences about
his dog- punctuated by barks - and pronouncements that he was the
son of Jesus Christ. Apparently having deteriorated during his parole,
N .E. clearly appears to be civilly committable. He was aware of this
possibility and indicated a desire that it take place.
S.G.1l 4
S.G. is a thirty-year-old male born on a farm during the Depression.
His father died when he was seven and by the time S.G. was ten he had
been in minor juvenile scrapes for which he was placed in a boys' vocational school. There his troubles continued with run-aways, poor schoolwork - although S.G. is "bright-normal" - and some homosexual activity.
The school released him to an aunt's farm, where he stayed only a short
time before he was civilly committed to a state hospital because of complaints of his acts of bestiality with cattle. His sanity has never been officially restored since this commitment. He achieved a convalescent status
from the hospital while he was in his early twenties, a status which
allows increasing periods of freedom. During one of these periods, S.G.
met and married a widow much older than himself - in his description "to get a more normal sexual outlet." The two of them lived a withdrawn
life together following carnivals around the state. Then S.G. was arrested
for breaking and entering an automobile; he pleaded guilty without counsel. Routine psychiatric evaluation during his two-year minimum term
classified him as a simple psychotic in satisfactory remission. After the
minimum term he was released on parole and he eventually began to live
at the home of his sister and brother-in-law. He remained there for four
months and then was charged by the brother-in-law with molesting the
couple's two children. S.G. was tried on this charge, and in contrast to
94 See

note 83 supra.
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his initial conviction he pleaded not guilty, took appointed counsel, and
despite the odds against a sexual deviate in a jury trial, was acquitted.
Nevertheless, he remained in jail for another week and at the end of the
week his prison parole was suspended on a medical warrant because of
the episode for which he had already been tried and acquitted. Now in
the Psychiatric Clinic, he explains that his medical return was for
treatment of his hemorrhoids. S.G. denies both the fact of his previous
commitment and the possibility that the child molestation charges were
well-founded.
P.H.95

P.H. is a twenty-five-year-old male who had two previous larceny,
one narcotics, and a number of drunk and disorderly, convictions. Appearing without counsel, he was convicted on a plea of guilty of larceny
in a building for having stolen a bottle of wine; he was sentenced to one
to four years. At the time of this conviction P.H. was on probation for
one of his previous convictions. He served his minimum sentence at Jackson, during which his only treatment was voluntary participation in Alcoholics Anonymous. On release on parole he lapsed back into a series
of drunk and disorderly arrests, a problem which he attempted to overcome by seeking treatment at a state alcoholic rehabilitation center. His
therapist there, who apparently achieved little success in treating P.H.'s
alcoholism, contacted the parole officer and recommended his return; this
was effectuated by means of a medical warrant. Back in prison, however,
P.H. was discharged to the general prison population because of the
Psychiatric Clinic's present inability to offer therapy for alcoholism.
Future therapy probably will be difficult in view of P.H's belie£ that his
therapist at the alcoholic rehabilitation center betrayed him.
C.J.96

C.J. is a nervous, effeminate twenty-year-old male who violated probation for another conviction by the unauthorized driving away of an
automobile. Having elected against representation by counsel-he hadn't
understood, he said, that the judge had been referring to a "state lawyer"
- he pleaded guilty and received a one to fifteen year sentence. Although
the circuit judge had noticed C.J.'s curiously withdrawn manner and
recommended a minimum-security camp, C.J. was sent to a reformatory,
where he served his minimum sentence. In spite of the £act that his
parents provided an undesirable home, he was paroled in their custody
because of the lack of any satisfactory alternative. During the four months
in which he remained on parole, C.J. attempted various unskilled jobs in
lumberyards and restaurants. Eventually he sought help from his parole
95 See notes 19, 39, and 79 supra.
96 See notes 13, 19, and 79 supra.
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officer for what he described as his fears of homosexuality. The parole
officer persisted in questioning him and eventually coaxed out a disturbing
recital of bizarre sexual behavior going back to the parolee's fourth year
of age. C.J. confessed to acts of voyeurism and transvestitism during his
current parole. Shortly after this confession G.J. was arrested for windowpeeping and while he was in jail, the parole officer arranged for evaluation of his case by a psychiatrist in a state hospital. The latter reported
that although the parolee was not overtly psychotic he was frightened of
his passive homosexuality and in danger of aggressively acting out his
desire to overcome it. This report indicated that treatment was not practical on an outpatient basis but suggested to the parole officer that C.J.
might be dangerous to the community. These fears were increased by
C.].'s unsubstantiated story of kidnapping and abusing a woman. Faced
with the psychiatrist's warning and denial of further professional help,
the parole officer reported G.J.'s failure to inform of whereabouts and
the window peeping episode as violations. As a result C.J. was returned
to prison on a violation warrant. He was directed to the psychiatric cell
block of Jackson Prison, where he remains at present. After a short period
of therapy he requested to be taken out of treatment which appeared to
have been relatively ineffective because of his immaturity. In several
statements C.J. described a fear of being transferred to Ionia State Hospital for the Criminally Insane.
A.K.97
A.K. is a thirty-five-year-old male who had been a telephone linesman
and installer. Earlier records describe him as "lively" and "talkative,"
but at the time of his interview he had deteriorated considerably and had
become withdrawn and uncommunicative. A first offender, on the advice
of appointed counsel A.K. had pleaded guilty to assault with intent
to rape. This plea appears to have been a "bargain" in a curious trial
on an information for statutory rape; the complaining witness may herself have been an incompetent or at least so feeble-minded as to have been
unconvincing. While A.K. served his minimum sentence of two years at
Jackson Prison he was only a moderately satisfactory prisoner, constantly
assertive and sensitive about his alleged sexual prowess. He received shock.
and drug therapy at the Psychiatric Clinic during this portion of his sentence. He was paroled to his wife and child in a small town in Michigan,
but left after he lost his job because, he said, his employer learned that he
was a parolee. At about this time his mother died. Shortly thereafter,
while on an unauthorized job-hunting expedition in another state, A.K.
attempted suicide by connecting a hose to his automobile exhaust. A.K.
may have suffered permanent organic brain damage from this attempt.
Upon his partial recovery he was placed in jail as a parole violator. While
97 See

notes 14 and 79 supra.
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in jail he became violently emotional and was returned on a violation
warrant which recited that he had failed to keep reasonable hours and
had left the state without permission. Since his return A.K.'s recovery has
been slight, and it appears that he will be placed in a Veteran's Administration Hospital after completion of his maximum sentence.
J.M.98

J.M. is a thirty-year-old male of doubtful legitimacy. Encouraged by
his step-father to steal, he led a shadowy, disrupted childhood. As a result
of his unruliness and unreceptive attitude, J.M. was eventually placed
in a state home for the feeble-minded. There he remained for several years,
indulging in a variety of sexual and homosexual activities, until authorities
discovered that he actually had at least average intelligence. J.M. then
was released and immediately relapsed into a routine of menial work,
excessive drinking, and petty delinquency. This culminated in a charge
of committing indecent liberties with children; he pleaded guilty without
counsel. The record of the trial suggests that J.M.'s state home history
was discussed with the trial judge but did not influence his sentencing.
J.M. went on parole after serving his minimum sentence and immediately
married a dull-witted, promiscuous woman, who soon bore two children.
Squabbles over cruelty, neglect, non-support, and indecent liberties with
the children brought about revocation of this first parole, and J.M. thereafter lost all contact with his wife. He was later re-paroled to his sister.
Again he lapsed into child-molestation, and on the theory J.M. had not
informed him that he was molesting children, his parole officer arranged
his reimprisonment on a violation warrant for "failure to inform parole
officer of whereabouts and activities." J.M. returned to Jackson and settled satisfactorily into prison routine, working in the prison cannery. On
review of his return, however, the Parole Board ruled that even the broad
language of "failure to inform" would not support a violation return on
the theory adopted by the parole officer. Instead, the board validated J.M.'s
return by changing it to a medical return. As a result of this formal change
from revocation to suspension, J.M. was automatically transferred from
the cannery to the Psychiatric Clinic, where he will remain until the
expiration of his sentence in the spring of 1961.
C.0.99
C.O., a thirty-year-old male, had been sentenced to three to fifteen years
for breaking and entering in the nighttime. He had a number of previous
felony convictions, all, with the exception of robbery, for non-violent
crimes. His present arrest was itself a violation of an outstate probation,
DS See note
90 Ibid.

79 supra.
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and he had previously violated parole on another sentence. In his ex.tensive prison experience, C.O. had acquired a considerable command of the
jargon of the psychiatrists and social worker and had become a "pro" in
the explanation of his own behavior in terms of hostility and aggression.
He grandiosely confessed at the time of arrest that led to his present conviction - after he had called attention to himself by leaving his hat at
the scene of a burglary and being quite vocal in his attempts to peddle
his proceeds. At his arraignment he pleaded not guilty, but then entered
a guilty plea at trial. C.O. served time at a prison farm- from which he
tried to escape - and at two state prisons. He made one ineffectual
attempt at suicide during this period but resisted psychiatric treatment.
"You have to be a fairy or a switch to get anywhere." He was paroled in
spite of the problematical risk. This parole, which was the shortest of the
twelve studied, started inauspiciously; C.O. was drunk when he appeared
for his initial interview with his parole officer. He refused to maintain
the hours imposed by the Salvation Army dormitory to which he had been
paroled. Shortly afterward, two barmaids in a seamy district complained
of C.O.'s forcing his attentions on them, often with threats of physical
abuse. Once he posed as a vice squad officer, another time as a parole
officer. He was convicted of the misdemeanor - creating a disturbance as a result of one of these complaints. This conviction, together with technical violations, was an "automatic violation" of parole. While awaiting
return to prison, he ineffectually attempted suicide by slashing at his
wrists with the edge of a crucifix. Although there can be little doubt
about the fairness of his return, it appears that the nature of C.O.'s behavior
cannot be clearly defined as either altogether "criminal" or altogether
"insane."
c.s.100

C.S., a bland, stocky male of twenty-five, received two to fifteen years
for breaking and entering in the nighttime. He had just returned to the
state after the failure of his marriage, and at the time of his sentencing
he was under detainer for armed robbery in another state. Otherwise, he
had no previous felony convictions. C.S. began his sentence at a reformatory, but was transferred to Jackson for clinical attention after going into
a catatonic state as a result of what he described as threats and innuendoes
by other inmates. His reaction to treatment was good. At the completion
of his minimum sentence C.S. was paroled under detainer. He pleaded
guilty to his out-of-state robbery indictment and soon was released after
treatment at a hospital in that state. He returned to Michigan and began his parole routine. After about four months he was arrested while
driving a stolen automobile and placed in jail. There C.S. "blacked out"
into another catatonic state. He was taken to a hospital and given medical
100 See

note 18 supra.
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treatment. When he recovered consciousness and attempted forcibly to
leave, he was overpowered, strapped down, and given a heavy sedative.
While he was unconscious from the sedative there seems to have been a
conference between his parole officer, the prosecutor, and the circuit judge
who would have tried the automobile case. The three agreed upon a
medical return in lieu of either trial or commitment, and local police
took C.S. to Jackson prison before he regained consciousness. He remains
there under treatment in the Psychiatric Clinic.
E.T.101

E.T. is a dull-witted twenty-five-year-old male who had previously been
arrested for minor juvenile offenses. His father, who was similarly dullwitted, may have encouraged his petty delinquency. Unrepresented by
counsel in his present trial, E.T., hoping to receive probation, pleaded
guilty to breaking and entering in the nighttime. Instead he was sentenced
to three to fifteen years. He began his sentence in a reformatory, but was
transferred to Jackson for psychiatric evaluation because of his lack of
response to supervision. Evaluation seems to have been attempted, but no
therapy was tried. Although once passed over because of his mental condition, E.T. was eventually granted parole at his parents' home. His parole
officer tolerated his unemployment and a jailing on a disorderly conduct
charge, but after he had been on parole for six months, he was arrested
as an accessory to breaking and entering and to driving away an automobile. Unable to raise bail, E.T. waited in jail about six months before
trial; during this time he signed a confession to the automobile incident.
An appointed lawyer advised him to plead incompetence, but his parole
officer - whom E.T. described as "a wonderful guy'' - suggested that he
plead guilty. The case never came to trial, for he was transferred to a state
hospital for a 60-day observation period in the hope that he could be committed as feeble-minded. After his hospital stay had been extended without
legal authority to almost a year, he was transferred to Jackson Prison on
a medical return. Although E.T. remains in the Psychiatric Clinic, classified a simple psychotic, he has not yet received treatment.
N.w.102

Possibly at the request of his appointed counsel, N.W., a twenty-five
year old male, was evaluated at a psychiatric clinic before his conviction
for driving away an automobile without authorization, but there were no
practical results from this evaluation, and N. W. was sentenced to eight
months to five years imprisonment. He had two previous convictions of a
similar nature and three for larceny. His father had once been the com101 See notes 13 and 41 supra.
102 See notes 13, 39, 41, 79, and 83 supra.

1126

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 59

plainant on a probation violation. N. W. served about a year of his sentence during which his cell block adjustment was good although he remained irresponsible in work. He was married, but his wife left him
during his imprisonment. Therefore he was paroled to his father's home.
There N. W. remained unsettled. He had no job and became involved in
family arguments and drinking; allegedly he forced his attentions on his
step-sister. After two or three months of conflict, his father had him committed to a state mental hospital. That institution released him in a convalescent status, and he left the state - a technical violation of parole.
While out of the state he was convicted of larceny and served a short sentence. When N. W. returned to Michigan he was recommitted to the state
hospital, possibly to avoid a parole return. Upon his discharge from the
hospital, he was returned on a medical warrant to Jackson. There he
seemed not to be interested in therapy and was soon discharged to the
general prison population.

